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Abstract. The presidents who routinely are judged the greatest leaders are also the most
heavily criticized by legal scholars. The reason is that the greatest presidents succeeded
by overcoming the barriers erected by Madison’s system of separation of powers, but the
legal mind sees such actions as breaches of constitutional norms that presidents are
supposed to uphold. With the erosion of Madisonian checks and balances, what stops
presidents from abusing their powers? The answer lies in the complex nature of
presidential leadership. The president is simultaneously leader of the country, a party, and
the executive branch. The conflicts between these leadership roles put heavy constraints
on his power.
While the topic of presidential leadership has fascinated political scientists and historians
for decades, legal scholars have completely ignored it. Legal scholars rarely discuss
“leadership”—of the president or anyone else. They are concerned with the legal constraints on
the presidency, not the opportunities that the office supplies to its occupant. Moreover, in
contrast to political scientists and historians, who find it difficult to resist celebrating presidents
who show great leadership qualities, legal scholars almost universally take a critical attitude
toward the president. 1 And the leaders who are frequently judged “great” by commentators—
including Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan—
receive the most critical attention. This is because those leaders turn out, with a few exceptions,
to be the presidents who most frequently tread on constitutional norms. This raises a paradox.
How can our top presidential leaders also be major lawbreakers? 2
To address this paradox, we start with the Constitution. The Constitution says almost
nothing about leadership. It does not identify a leader of the country, a head of state, or even a
head of government. By vesting the executive power in the president, it implies that the president
is leader of the executive branch, but not that he is the leader of the country or the government.
Moreover, not everyone agrees that the president is leader of the executive branch. Even today it
is controversial whether executive agencies must answer to the president; the so-called
independent agencies like the Fed do not. Congress sets up agencies and gives them their
marching orders, controls their budget, and routinely harangues their chiefs. And, of course,
Congress demands that the president comply with its laws, citing the Take Care Clause and the
Supremacy Clause. The text of the Constitution could be read to envision a president who is
merely an agent of Congress, one who has little discretion to exercise leadership except perhaps
of a small staff of assistants.

1
A representative example is Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (2010). For an
alternative view, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic
(2011).
2
For purposes of this essay, I rely on the judgments about presidential greatness of historians, political scientists,
journalists, and compilers of top-ten lists—and do not make my own.
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The Constitution is hardly clearer about Congress. The Constitution designates the VicePresident as president of the Senate, but in constitutional practice he is not its leader. The
Constitution gives the Senate and House the power to elect officers, and the leadership positions
in those institutions emerge from that process. Even so, there is not a leader of the House or of
the Senate in a meaningful sense. The real leadership positions are held by the top party official
in each body—so Congress has four leaders, with the majority leaders being something like
coequals. Finally, the Constitution does not create a leader of the courts (though it refers in
passing to a Chief Justice presiding over impeachment trials). Congress created the position of
Chief Justice, whose powers over the federal judiciary are limited.
Why does the Constitution say so little about leadership? The founders sought a more
effective executive after the debacle of the Articles of Confederation, but they also feared an
excessively powerful national government, whether one led by an imperial president or by a
tyrannical legislature. The solution was to be elections supplemented by the system of separation
of powers. Elections would ensure that government officials enjoy popular support when they
reach office but they could not, by themselves, prevent those officials from accumulating power
while in office and then using that power both to maintain their position and abuse the public
trust. The separation of powers addressed this risk. Madison argued that each of the three
branches of government would compete for power and in the process constrain each other. The
usual picture is one in which the officials in each branch are motivated to inflate their personal
power by expanding the power of the branch in which they operate, and hence by resisting the
efforts of officials in other branches to extend their power. Actions that seek to redistribute
power—actions that would result in power being concentrated in one office or branch—would be
blocked. Actions that advance the public interest would (presumably) not be blocked. A separate
executive branch would enable the government to act quickly and decisively, but because the
executive would derive most of its authority from Congress, it would be blocked from expanding
its power.
Consistent with the Madisonian structure, then, the Constitution—more by implication
than by language—creates a group of leaders, but no leader of the nation. The government is a
kind of institutional confederacy. The founders, who were well-versed in classical history, may
have envisioned a system like the Roman Republic, where there were leaders but no Leader. The
Roman Senate was a collective body, and men with distinctive gifts like Cicero could emerge as
leaders at critical moments. But leadership was fluid; it moved from one person to another in
response to events. The most important office was the consul, but there always were two consuls,
and they served only for a year. A dictator could be authorized for short periods during military
emergencies. These and many other restrictions on office-holding worked to block—or at least
retard—the emergence of charismatic individuals whose power derived from their personalities,
connections, accomplishments, and family lineage, rather than from their temporary occupation
of an institutional position. The Roman Republic survived for centuries without a king. Men who
sought to become Leaders, like Sulla and Caesar, were seen as usurpers. The imperial leadership
of Augustus and his successors was not possible until the Republic collapsed.
But the founders’ aversion to a national leader ran into trouble from the start. Even while
debating in Philadelphia, it was widely understood that the new country would be led by a great
man—George Washington. And he would not be speaker of the House or Chief Justice. Just as
2
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he was president of the Constitutional Convention, he would be president of the country. The
selection of Washington was an obvious choice. He was not just the hero of the Revolution; he
was a natural leader who had earned the trust of his officers and soldiers through many years of
war. The new country’s best chance was to throw its lot to a man who already enjoyed the trust
of the nation. And the position of president rather than House Speaker or Chief Justice was the
obvious choice as well. He was a military man, and what the country needed was a military
leader to protect it from Indians, Europeans, and internal dissenters. So while the founders
drafted a document that failed to recognize a national leader, they prepared the way for the first
and greatest national leader. The negation of presidential leadership was to be a legal fiction.
**
The immediate resort to presidential leadership spelled trouble for the Madisonian
system. The system of separation of powers was supposed to allow decisive action by the
executive while blocking it or any other part of government from acquiring excessive power, but
it has never been clear how this system could work. The Constitution’s checks and balances
simply make it difficult for the national government to act—whether for good or for bad. The
basic problem with a government action—whether a military operation, negotiation of a trade
treaty, or the construction of a new canal—is that it creates losers as well as winners. Vetogates
enable potential losers to head off government action that harms them, but the more vetogates
that are built into the system, the easier it is for losers to block actions that are in the public
interest. This means that government actions that benefit the public can be blocked by people
harmed by those actions unless they are compensated. Indeed, even if the actions hurt no one at
all, people located at the vetogates can block the action unless they receive special treatment.
Separation of powers, which is distinguished from other systems like parliamentary government
by the large number of vetogates it creates, just leads to gridlock—an ineffective government.
The rise of presidential leadership, beginning as we said as early as George Washington,
only partly ameliorated this problem. Washington alone entered office with a large enough
wellspring of trust to enable him to use the office aggressively—and, even then, he frequently
acted with extreme caution, careful to consult Congress and follow its laws even during
emergencies like the Whiskey Rebellion. Only a few successors with exceptional talents—
Jefferson, Jackson, Polk maybe—could overcome the barriers to government action, and they did
so only on occasion. However, perhaps because the country was focused inward during the first
sixty years of its existence—or perhaps because the party system would permit new forms of
cooperation among the branches—the cumbersome structure of the national government could
be tolerated. State governments undertook internal development. Congress tended to give the
president a free hand for foreign relations and military operations—where quick and decisive
actions were necessary, and the gains from security or territorial conquest could be widely
distributed. Otherwise, the national government was weak and presidential leadership thin. The
great controversies over slavery were resolved by Congress, not the president. And then the
system buckled. The country was saved by Lincoln, the greatest leader since Washington, who
ran roughshod over the Madisonian system in countless ways. But it was in the twentieth century
that separation of powers gave way decisively to a system of personalistic leadership by the
president.

3

The evolution was not linear but it was unmistakable. Markers along the way included
Theodore Roosevelt’s innovation of appealing directly to the public for support rather than
working through Congress; the concentration of national power under Woodrow Wilson; the vast
expansion of the federal bureaucracy under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, including the
inauguration of a new form of administrative government; and the Cold War-era consolidation of
presidential control over a vast standing army and foreign policy. A subtle but important change
was that the locus of policymaking authority moved from Congress to the president. While
Congress would continue to debate legislation, the president set the agenda. From a legal
standpoint, the expansion of presidential power took two forms: the enactment of hundreds of
statutes that gave the president vast discretionary authority and large staffs to implement it; and
presidential assertions of unilateral authority under the Constitution. The first required active
congressional participation, the second, acquiescence; but they were mutually reinforcing, and
the Supreme Court—after modest resistance that ended with Roosevelt’s court-packing plan—
gave its imprimatur.
While the separation of powers eroded, the president’s personal authority expanded.
Today, he can use his legal and constitutional authority to implement many of the policies he
prefers. He still needs congressional authority for major legislative changes, but the president
initiates the debate by appealing to the public and demanding support from the thousands of
people who owe him favors for patronage and other benefits he has bestowed or has the capacity
to bestow. He leads his party, which also gives him authority over Congress when his party
enjoys a majority in both houses, and influence over Congress even when he doesn’t. He
nominates judges who advance his ideological goals, and fills the top ranks of the bureaucracy
with his supporters. He leads an institution that gathers and processes information (especially
confidential information) much better than Congress can, and this informational advantage—
along with the fact that he occupies his office continuously while Congress comes and goes—
gives him the ability to set the agenda and control the public debate, to act and confront
Congress, passive and divided as always, with a fait accompli. 3
The Obama administration exemplifies all these trends. President Obama came to office
promising economic stimulus, financial regulation, universal health care, climate regulation,
immigration reform, and reforms to counterterrorism. He set the agenda; Congress reacted.
Congress gave him the legislation he sought in the first three cases: economic stimulus, the
Dodd-Frank Act, and the Affordable Care Act. The second two examples are of dual
significance. Not only did Congress acquiesce in the president’s legislative agenda; it vastly
expanded his authority, and the authority of his successors, to regulate—that is, to make policy
decisions—in the financial and health sectors of the economy. While Congress refused to give
Obama the climate and immigration laws he sought, the president implemented his plans
administratively, relying both on constitutional norms of executive discretion and existing
statutes that gave him vast authority. The regulations were not as far-reaching as the legislation
he sought, but they accomplished a great deal. Obama also used his regulatory authority and his
legal team to advance gay rights. Of all of Obama’s major policy initiatives, the only one that
Congress has completely frustrated is his plan to shut down the prison located at Guantanamo
Bay.

3

William G. Howell, Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action (2003).
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But the erosion of separation of powers did not lead to the abuses that the founders
feared. While his critics argue—often with justice—that Obama has violated constitutional
norms, the president is not a dictator; his policies have enjoyed the support of majorities or large
minorities. It is a major irony that the presidents whom historians and political scientists have
declared great leaders and placed on their top-ten lists have engaged in constitutionally dubious
behavior on a grand scale: Washington, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt,
Truman, Lyndon Johnson, Reagan. While Nixon reigns as the greatest constitutional
lawbreaker—and no one, I think, would call him a great leader—all the presidents who were
constitutionally scrupulous have also been the most insignificant and are now forgotten. This
raises a question. If the separation of powers no longer constrains presidents from committing
abuses, what does?
**
The answer lies in the nature of presidential leadership, and the peculiar way in which the
psychology of leadership interacts with the institutional system we have inherited from the
founders. While George Washington was already turning the office of the presidency into the
primary leadership position of the country, he did this in the context of the separation-of-powers
structure. Washington was from the start the leader of the country—in defiance of the
Constitution—but he was also the leader of the executive branch. Consistent with the
constitutional structure, this meant that Washington found himself frequently being opposed by
Congress. And then there was a development that the Constitution failed to envision.
Washington soon found himself the de facto leader of the Federalists. In later years, when the
party system fully emerged, the president would formally be the leader of his party. And so with
the president today. He leads three separate institutions: the country, the executive branch, and
his party.
To understand the significance of this state of affairs, we need to examine the concept of
leadership more carefully than we have so far. Broadly speaking, a leader is someone who can
motivate a group to act in ways that maximize the well-being of the group or promote its values.
Leaders typically face a collective action problem among group members who prefer to act in
their self-interest unless they can be assured that all members of the group act in the group
interest. The successful leader provides these assurances. Thus, leadership seems to depend
fundamentally on the ability of the leader to acquire and maintain the trust of the group. As long
as the group believes that the leader will act in the interest of all its members, and is intelligent
and informed enough to make correct choices, the group will give the leader its trust, and the
leader will be able to lead by making choices on the group’s behalf.
How do leaders inspire trust in their followers? A huge and inconclusive literature has
failed to identify specific personality attributes or skills that are associated with leadership
(though this hasn’t stopped thousands of educational institutions from offering courses in
“leadership”). 4 In practice, however, we can see that the leader demonstrates persuasively—
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In the presidential literature, an immense wave of speculation was triggered by Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential
Power: The Politics of Leadership (1960); see also Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style
from FDR to Clinton (2000); George R. Goethals, “Presidential Leadership,” Annual Review of Psychology 56
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through word and action—that he shares the group’s interests and will keep his promises. Most
leaders thus depend on their reputation, which they build up through a long career of
demonstrating success in different organizations and in increasingly large and heterogeneous
groups. Group members typically trust leaders because the leader hails from the group, has
demonstrated integrity by keeping his promises, and shown competence by making choices that
advance the group’s interest. Nearly all American political leaders were born in America (and, of
course, the president must be by law), and all presidents have held office or other significant
leadership positions before being elected. Presidents who are judged great leaders overcome
entrenched resistance to implement policies that advance the public interest; they do so usually
by knitting together a coalition of groups whose trust they have managed to win.
People with identical leadership qualities can be greater or lesser leaders depending on
the political context in which they operate. Some authors emphasize the large role of public
expectations, which are shaped in part by the behavior of previous presidents; and the way that a
president’s biography and personality resonate with the public at a particular moment of history. 5
Thus, the search for a specific personality types that lends itself to leadership is futile.
Sometimes, there is little scope for leadership because the country is happy or excessively
divided; a leader with exceptional talents may therefore accomplish little. When people have
diverse interests, policies that advance the interest of one group may harm another group. The
leader faces the challenge of arranging for a transfer to the harmed group, or promising it future
policies that will benefit it in return for support for an action that hurts group members in the
short term. Circumstances will define in part the interests of the group. So a population will be
more unified when facing a foreign threat than when debating the progressivity of taxes. This is
probably why wartime presidents are often remembered as great leaders.
Regarding the question why presidents do not abuse their positions, the answer is
connected to conflicts inhering in the institutional arrangements that he must manage. In place of
the Madisonian triptych of executive-legislative-judicial, let me propose a different tripartite
structure: executive-party-country. And in place of the Madisonian political equilibrium
maintained by the interaction of three opposing forces, consider a set of concentric circles. The
president remains the leader of the executive branch under the surviving detritus of the
constitutional structure imagined by Madison. By tradition, he is leader of the country. He is also
leader of his party. So the president is leader of three different groups at the same time.
Remember that leadership depends on maintaining the trust of the group. This means
acting in the interest of the group, and that often means at the expense of others, the people
outside the group. When the president acts as leader of the nation, the group consists of all
Americans, while the outsiders are foreigners. When the president acts as leader of his party, the
group consists of party members—Democrats or Republicans. When the president acts as leader
of the executive branch, the group consists of the members of the federal bureaucracy, including
the military. This means that members of one group may be excluded from another group, and
yet they look to the same person for leadership.

(2005): 545-70. There are also thousands of books about the leadership qualities of CEOs, generals, and so on,
which collectively manage to produce a small pile of clichés.
5
Stephen Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and Reappraisal (2d ed. 2011).
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Consider, for example, President Obama’s counterterrorism policies—including his use
of drone strikes to assassinate suspected members of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Obama
believes that it is in the interest of the country to maintain these policies, but in the process he
has angered his party—or a substantial segment of the party, who oppose them. But while
aggressive counterterrorism tactics have cost Obama the support of people in his party, they have
helped him maintain support among people outside his party, or at least to soften their
opposition. The policies make it harder for Republicans to accuse him of being soft on terrorism,
of being a closet Muslim, of disregarding American security.
At the same time, many of Obama’s policies advance his party’s interests. Here, I mean
both the party’s strategic interests and the values the party stands for. Immigration reform
provides a good example. Democrats seek to cultivate the support of Hispanics, and most
Hispanics support Obama’s executive actions to protect people who entered the country illegally.
Obama’s support for the Dodd-Frank Act was consistent with Democrats’ view that the financial
industry should be subject to greater regulation. The Affordable Care Act also advanced a
longtime Democratic position that health insurance should be provided universally.
So Obama, like his predecessors, must maintain his leadership of the country and his
leadership of the party, and it turns out that strengthening his leadership of one group hurts his
leadership of the other group. The mechanism is straightforward. When Obama takes an action
that advances the interest of one group at the expense of the other, the group that is hurt begins to
wonder whether he has its interests at heart. It is more inclined to distrust him, even as the other
group’s trust is enhanced.
The president’s leadership of the executive branch introduces yet another complicating
factor. The federal bureaucracy comprises two groups of people: political appointees and civilservice employees. Political appointees head the agencies and fill their top ranks. Within this
group, the highest-ranked appointees must be confirmed by the Senate; lower-ranked positions
can be filled by the president without Senate approval. The president almost always selects
political officials from the pool of personal and party loyalists. And these people often expect to
be rewarded for loyal service with future promotions, access to the president, and plum jobs
outside of government in think tanks and elsewhere.
Civil-service employees are typically appointed by the agency heads, who are not
permitted to take partisan loyalties into account when hiring and in any event civil-service
employees will stay in office long after the administration turns over. Civil-service employees
also vastly outnumber the political employees, so while they are nominally subordinate, their
expertise, mastery of institutional norms, and numbers ensure that they control most of an
agency’s day-to-day actions. They can also embarrass their political leaders by leaking
confidential documents, complaining to the press, dragging their feet when asked to implement
policies that the president favors, and threatening to resign.
The bureaucracy creates both opportunities and headaches for presidential leadership.
One way for presidents to maintain party loyalty is to give patronage appointments to party
members who are disappointed by his policy choices. Patronage appointments enhance party
leadership but it comes at the cost of both executive-branch and national leadership. Civil
7

servants resent serving under hacks. And the country may believe that the president is putting
party loyalty over the public good.
If the president is to please the party or the country, he needs the cooperation of the
bureaucracy because the bureaucracy is his instrument of action. This not only constrains his
freedom to make patronage appointments; it also forces him to protect executive-branch officials
from Congress. One of the great flashpoints between presidents and Congress is executive
privilege, which all modern presidents have used aggressively to protect appointees from
embarrassing inquiries and investigations. But executive privilege raises another problem. When
the president uses secrecy to protect officials, the public may suspect that the president is hiding
wrongdoing. Presidential secrecy may strengthen his leadership of his bureaucracy but, by
sowing distrust among the public, weaken his leadership of the country.
We should also address the risk that the president could abuse power though his
leadership of the bureaucracy. This risk plays a part in political discourse, and worries about it
have a distinguished historical pedigree. After all, the great Roman leaders who helped bring
down the Republic owed their power to their leadership over the army. In the end, soldiers were
more loyal to the generals than to the state. In 1951, Truman lost confidence in, and the
confidence of, General MacArthur, and it has been argued that the country came close to a coup
d’état. In modern times, people worry that the president can use the civilian bureaucracy to spy
on citizens, stifle dissent, and interfere with personal freedom. There are still respectable
commentators who see the military as a threat to civilian independence. 6
But as we have seen, to lead the bureaucracy, the president needs its trust, and
maintaining the trust of the bureaucracy is in tension with national and party leadership. Reagan
was elected on a platform that criticized burdensome federal regulation, but he couldn’t simply
abolish the bureaucracy. He needed it to unwind some regulations while maintaining others.
Thus, he had to temper his criticisms once in office while still trying to appease the antiregulatory wing of his party. Obama campaigned on a platform calling for greater transparency
of the bureaucracy, but has failed to follow through because he needs the trust of officials who
work for him. In this case, Obama was willing to anger his party in order to appease the
bureaucracy, whose assistance he needed to advance policies he cared about.
Leadership depends on trust, but people tend to distrust those who exercise power over
them—the president above all. Presidential leadership is constrained by deep egalitarian and
antiauthoritarian norms that constantly replenish the well of suspicion from which the pubic
draws when it evaluates presidential rhetoric and action. The country was settled by dissenters,
founded on revolution against a king, and developed by frontiersmen, who contributed to a
national mythology of self-reliance. So while presidential leadership is acknowledged as
necessary, the actions of president and all contenders for the presidency are subject to relentless
scrutiny. This level of scrutiny has increased over the decades in tandem with the rise of
presidential power. Today, the president is stripped of all privacy, like the kings of old whose
bowel movements were examined by courtiers for signs of disease. Every aspect of his private
life (with a partial exception for his young children) is considered a legitimate topic for media
scrutiny and public debate. This is meant not only to assure us that our trust in the president is
6
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not misplaced but, through his ritual humiliation, compensate us for our subordination to him.
This tendency is everywhere, and the conspiracy theories that surround every president—in
Obama’s case, centering on the question of whether he was born outside this country and is a
closet Muslim—is only an extreme version of it. In the United States, conspiracy-mongering by
alienated political minorities combines with pervasive egalitarian resentment among the wider
public that a great man (or woman) lords over all of us, to provide a checking power far more
significant than the paper barriers of the Constitution. Day after day the president must labor to
retain the public’s trust.
**
The Madisonian system sought to prevent government abuse by creating a set of
competing institutions that check the ambitions of officeholders in each. The theory is that if no
branch of government can dominate the government, then power will never be concentrated
enough to do real harm. But we can also understand this system in the light of the founders’ fears
about dominance by charismatic leaders like Caesar or Cromwell. Most of the individuals who
operate the levers of power within the various branches would remain faceless cogs in the
Madisonian wheelwork, while the handful of talented men who could distinguish themselves
would never obtain a national following, or at least not for long. The system was constructed so
as to block the emergence of dominating leaders at the national level.
But Madison’s system failed because it set up too many vetogates, rendering the federal
government unable to function effectively. It also underestimated the unifying power of national
leadership. By the twentieth century, it was clear that Madison’s system made it impossible for a
national government to effectively regulate the new national economy, to provide for social
welfare, and to protect the country from foreign threats. Activist presidents with outstanding
leadership abilities dismantled the Madisonian system piece by piece, paving the way for our
current president-centered system of national administration, one that heavily relies on the
magnetism, talent, and organizational abilities of the presidents, who are kept in check these days
by public scrutiny, the media, and the challenge of leading different institutions and groups in an
enormous country. Those presidents are the presidents that law professors condemn for their
lawbreaking and historians celebrate for their greatness.
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